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Comments
Duty of Owners and Occupiers of Land to Persons
Entering the Premises: Should Pennsylvania
Abandon the Common Law Approach?
I. INTRODUCTION
When a person is injured while on the property of another, the
common law approach to determining liability has been to focus
primarily on the status of the entrant rather than the conduct of the
owner or occupier.' Under the common law, a landowner's duty
depended on whether the entrant was classified as a trespasser,2
licensee, 3 or invitee.1 Although this approach is still followed by a
majority of jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania,5 it has been and
continues to be extensively criticized.'
In 1968, in the landmark decision of Rowland v. Christian,7 Cali-
fornia became the first common law jurisdiction to abandon the
classification system and determine landowner liability to entrants
based on ordinary negligence standards.8 Since then, the District of
1. Hereafter the terms "owner" or "landowner" will be used when referring to occupiers
as well as owners of land.
2. "A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another
without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF Toirs § 329 (1965).
3. "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of
the possessor's consent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965).
4. (1) An invitee is either a public invitee or business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor
of the land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToiRs § 332 (1965).
5. See note 88 infra.
6. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra.
7. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). For a detailed discussion of
Rowland, see notes 37-43 and accompanying text infra.
8. The court held:
The proper test to be applied . . . is whether in the management of his property
[the landowner] has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury
to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the
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Columbia Circuit and five other states have followed California's
lead.'
In the area of landowner liability to entrants, the competing inter-
ests are the free use of property by owners and the safety of persons
entering thereon.'" The aim of this comment is to examine the two
approaches to deciding liability and to determine which one more
effectively serves the interests of landowner and entrant in Pennsyl-
vania and elsewhere.
II. THE COMMON LAW CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM APPROACH
A. Historical Background
While the origins of the common law entrant classification system
are somewhat uncertain, it apparently emerged from a culture
deeply rooted to land which traced many standards to a heritage of
feudalism." This is understandable since land was once the basis for
all class distinctions, thereby causing agrarian societies to place
great emphasis on its ownership. 2 The landowner was accorded
such deference that he was considered to be a sovereign, to some
extent, within his own territory. The theory behind the classifica-
tion system seemed to be to promote the free use of property by not
imposing stringent duties on the landowner to insure the safety of
question of liability, the status is not determinative.
Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959), an earlier admi-
ralty jurisdiction case, paved the way for the decision in Rowland. The Supreme Court
concluded that the common law entrant classification system was alien to the law of the sea.
358 U.S. at 632.
9. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mile High Fence
Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu,
51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973); Basso
v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E. 2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph
DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975). Massachusetts and Minnesota have followed
the ordinary negligence approach with respect to invitees and licensees, but have retained
the trespasser rule. See notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra.
10. See Comment, The Common Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land: A
Trap for the Unwary?, 36 MD. L. REV. 816, 836 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Common Law
Tort Liability]. The common law system arguably promotes freer use of property because
the duty of the landowner to exercise reasonable care only applies to invitees. See notes 18-
23 and accompanying text infra.
11. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. at 630.
12. See 18 How. L.J. 220, 223 (1973).
13. See F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 159 (1926) [hereinafter cited as
BOHLEN].
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all entrants, particularly those entering without permission.
A major reason for the emergence of the classification system, in
addition to the emphasis on land ownership, was that the law of
negligence was undeveloped at that time.'" When negligence princi-
ples finally evolved, the field of landowner liability was already
occupied by the firmly entrenched common law system.'" Given the
judicial respect for the principle of stare decisis, which promotes
predictability and stability in the law, it was clear that any changes
in this area would be slow in coming.
B. The Common Law System Applied
The common law system denominates three principal categories
for purposes of describing the status of entrants on the property of
others. Under this system an entrant is either a trespasser, licensee,
or invitee.' 7 The landowner's duty varies depending on the status of
the entrant.
The least duty owed is to the trespasser. All that a landowner
must do with regard to trespassers is to refrain from intentionally
injuring them.'8 This standard was apparently derived from the
Crown's asserted power to punish misconducts or breaches of the
peace even if committed on the property of a nobleman."
With regard to licensees, the landowner's duty is to warn of con-
cealed dangers and to refrain from dangerous active conduct. 0 The
14. See 58 MARQ. L. REv. 609 (1975).
15. See Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68 YALE
L.J. 633, 694 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hughes]; Marsh, The History and Comparative
Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 184 (1953). When the common
law categories were being developed the privileged position of the landowner was taken for
granted, whereas the principle that a man should be responsible for damages he reasonably
should have foreseen was inconceivable and only hesitatingly recognized in a limited number
of cases. Marsh, supra at 184.
16. The king's law stopped at the boundary of the owner's sovereign territory.
.. * When the comparatively modem law of negligence reached the relations of
landowners to persons entering his property, it found the field occupied by this
concept of the owner's right as sovereign to do what he pleased on or with his own
property.
BOHLEN, supra note 13, at 163.
17. These terms are defined at notes 2-4 supra.
18. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 27.1 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER
AND JAMES].
19. See BOHLEN, supra note 13, at 163.
20. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18. See also ROBFERT LEVIN, RUSSELL LEVIN and L.
LEVIN, I SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE §§ 26, 28 (1958).
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reason that the duty owed a licensee is so slight is because of the
terms and conditions of the entrance.2 1 A licensee enters with the
bare permission of the owner and confers no pecuniary benefit upon
him.212
The highest duty owed is to the invitee, requiring the landowner
to use reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions on the prop-
erty and either remedy them or give a warning. 23 A confusing aspect
of this category is that it does not encompass all persons invited onto
the premises, just those entering for a business purpose or for the
purpose for which the property is maintained."
Sweeny v. Old Colony and Newport Railroad5 is generally re-
garded as the first case to adopt the common law classification
system in this country. In Sweeny the plaintiff, who was driving a
horse and wagon, was struck by a train while crossing the tracks
after the railroad's flagman indicated it was safe to cross. The court
stated that generally no duty of reasonable care is owed to a tres-
passer or licensee; but, if there is an invitation, due care is required
to keep the premises safe.2' The inducement of the flagman was held
to have made the plaintiff an invitee, therefore subjecting the land-
owner railroad to the higher standard.Y
Most jurisdictions adopted the classification system set forth in
Sweeny and approached landowner liability cases by focusing pri-
marily on the status of the entrant as determined thereunder. The
three entrant categories were applied rigidly,2 at least initially, and
the characterization of the entrant as either trespasser, invitee, or
21. See BOHLEN, supra note 13, at 157.
22. A noted jurist made the remark that, "Any complaint by a licensee may be said to
wear the colour of ingratitude." BOHLEN, supra note 13, at 157. Invitees generally confer a
pecuniary benefit on the landowner. A business visitor, because he enters the property for
business purposes, creates the potential for commercial gain to the landowner. A public
invitee, who is in many cases a taxpayer may be said to be paying for the privilege of entering
public lands. Conversely, a social guest does not generally compensate the landowner in
exchange for permission to enter his property. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
23. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18.
24. See note 4 supra. A social guest is not an invitee. This distinction "has puzzled
generations of law students, and even some lawyers." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
Toms § 60, at 378 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
25. 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865).
26. Id. at 372-73.
27. Id. at 376-77.
28. "[Tlhe line that separates each of these three classes is an absolutely rigid line. There
is no half-way house, no no-man's land between adjacent territories." Robert Addie & Sons
v. Dumbreck, as cited in PROSSER, supra note 24, at § 58 n.63.
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licensee was, in most cases, determinative of liability. 9
However, courts were quick to carve out exceptions and create
subclassifications' to deal with special situations, thus avoiding
harsh results that would potentially follow from a strict application
of the tripartite classification system. In certain cases the concept
of invitation is stretched to the breaking point to reach a just re-
sult.3' An example of this is the manner in which courts classify
public employees, such as policemen and firemen. Even though they
often fail to meet the traditional criteria, they are sometimes given -
the highest protection-that of an invitee.2 As a result, the law in
every state following the common law approach has become riddled
with exceptions to the general rule.33
III. THE ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE APPROACH
The initial assault upon the common law classification system
occurred in 1959 in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique,34 which originated in the admiralty jurisdiction.
The Court maintained that the use of classifications and subclassifi-
cations produced confusion and conflict, and, further, that such a
legal system was alien to the law of the sea.35 The Court suggested
that even the common law jurisdictions, while nominally following
the classification system to determine liability, were actually taking
29. The court in Rowland was concerned with this when it stated the test it would apply
in determining landowner's liability to injured entrants. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d
108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968).
30. Examples of these are business invitee, business visitor, bare licensee, social guest,
gratuitous licensee, licensee by invitation, social licensee, implied licensee, implied invitee
and licensee by permission. These subcategories were variations of the same theme and were
indications that the categorization of entrants onto land may have been too diverse for
meaningful classification. 18 How. L.J. 220, 221 (1973).
31. See BOHLEN, supra note 13, at 160.
32. See Common Law Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 827. Policemen and firemen are
generally not invited onto the premises. Nevertheless, courts supply that missing element by
employing the' legal fiction of constructive invitation.
33. See 37 LA. L. REv. 1174, 1178 (1977). The Supreme Court of Minnesota has observed,
"Today, there are, so many exceptions that it is nearly impossible to record all of them."
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639, 644 (1972).
34. 358 U.S. 625 (1959). Since Kermarec merely refused to extend the common law ap-
proach to landowner liability in the admiralty area, but did not say this approach was
impermissible for the states in terrestrial matters, the case represents persuasive rather than
binding authority for state courts. Id. at 631.
35. Id. at 631-32.
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an ordinary negligence approach.36
Nine years later, California, in the case of Rowland v. Christian,37
became the first state to depart from the common law system of
landowner liability and adopt an ordinary negligence standard. The
Rowland case involved an individual who injured his hand on a
cracked faucet while in the defendant's apartment as a social
guest.3 8 In rejecting the common law approach, the court main-
tained that to focus on the status of the injured party to determine
whether the landowner has a duty is contrary to modern social
mores and humanitarian values .3 The court considered the relevant
factors in determining liability to be the connection between the
injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral blame related to such
conduct, the policy or preventing future harm and the availability
of insurance."0 As support for its decision, the court referred to the
state Civil Code and claimed that it imposed a duty of reasonable
care on landowners. 4
In a brief dissent, Justice Burke declared the common law system
to be a reasonable and workable approach to the problems involved,
and one which provides the degree of stability and predictability so
highly prized in the law. 4 He expressed the concern that the deci-
sion of the majority might open the door to potentially unlimited
landowner liability. 43
36. The Court declared, "Through this semantic morass the common law has moved,
unevenly and with hesitation, towards imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of
reasonable care in all the circumstances." Id. at 631.
37. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
38. Id. at 110, 443 P.2d at 562, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 98. A social guest is generally considered
to be a licensee. See notes 3 & 24 supra.
39. 69 Cal.2d at 118, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
40. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103. The Rowland test for liability under
the ordinary negligence approach is set forth at note 8 supra.
41. 69 Cal.2d at 111-12, 443 P.2d at 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99. The Code states that:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in management
of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases
is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
42. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105 (Burke, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 121, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105 (Burke, J., dissenting). This
observation seemed to be grounded in his statement that subsequent issues of landowner
liability would be decided on an ad hoc basis, bereft of the guiding principles and precedent
which the law has heretofore attached by virtue of the relationship of the parties to one
another. But see note 100 infra.
Vol. 17: 153
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The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Pickard v. City and County of
Honolulu" followed Rowland and held that landowners had a duty
to use reasonable care for the safety of all persons reasonably antici-
pated to be on the premises. 5 The court merely stated, without
other support, that the common law distinctions had no logical
relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for the safety of oth-
ers. 
4
In 1971 Colorado abrogated the common law classifications in
Mile High Fence Company v. Radovich.7 This case involved a po-
lice officer who broke his leg when he stepped into a post hole dug
by the defendant company. The court held that it could no longer
permit a landowner's liability to depend solely on the status of the
plaintiff." The court noted that it had departed from the common
law distinctions in the past without actually confronting the prob-
lem. 4 The stated reasons for abandoning the common law approach
were that it led to confusion and judicial waste and that harsh
results could occur because the approach could keep meritorious
cases away from the jury. 0 Because of the focus on status under the
common law approach, the court observed that the reasonableness
of defendant's conduct was often not discussed.51 Lastly, the court
pointed out that an in depth analysis of the Second Restatement of
Torts shows that foreseeability of harm, rather than status, is the
controlling determinant of liability under the common law ap-
proach.2
The District of Columbia was next in joining the minority of
jurisdictions employing the ordinary negligence approach through
its decision in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc.53 The court
stated that the pre-eminence of land over life could no longer be
44. 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969).
45. Id. at 135, 452 P.2d at 446 (plaintiff injured from falling through a hole in the floor of
an unlighted restroom).
46. Id. at 135, 452 P.2d at 446.
47. 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
48. Id. at 541, 489 P.2d at 311.
.49. Id. at 541-42, 489 P.2d at 311. This concern was also expressed in Kermarec. See note
36 and accompanying text supra.
50. 175 Colo. at 542-43, 489 P.2d at 311.
51. Id. at 543, 489 P.2d at 312-13.
52. Id. at 547, 489 P.2d at 314. See, e.g., RSrATEmENT (Sacom) oF Toms §§ 334, 336,
337, and 339 (1965).
53. 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Smith a health inspector was injured when he slipped
on the greasy stairs of defendant's restaurant.
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accepted .5 Because standards for determining negligence are firmly
established, the court rejected the argument that the elimination of
the classifications would leave a jury without standards. 51
New Hampshire also followed those jurisdictions which had aban-
doned the common law approach. In an opinion which was limited
in its analysis, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that in
determining the liability of a landlord for persons injured on the
leased premises, the landlord must act as a reasonable person under
all circumstances. 56
In 1975, Rhode Island, by its decision in Mariorenzi v. Joseph
DiPonte, Inc.,57 became the fifth state to adopt the ordinary negli-
gence approach. In this wrongful death action, plaintiff's five year
old son drowned when he fell into a water-filled leaching field on
defendant's property. The trial judge denied recovery, holding the
child to be a trespasser to whom no duty was owed.18 In reversing,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the common law status
would no longer be determinative of duty, but the question to be
resolved is whether the owner has used reasonable care for the safety
of all persons reasonably expected upon his premises.59
Justice Joslin, dissenting, argued that it was socially desirable to
allow the free use of land for which the common law system pro-
vided. Moreover, he claimed that such a substantial change in the
law should be left to the legislature.60
New York, in Basso v. Miller,"' has been the jurisdiction to most
54. Id. at 101.
55. Id. at 105. See 45 FORD. L. Rav. 682, 690 (1976). Conduct can be assessed by using
the ordinary tort standard of reasonableness.
56. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973) (plaintiff's child fell to
her death from an outdoor stairway of an apartment building).
57. 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975). Mariorenzi can be considered the only authoritative
precedent for abrogating the common law approach because it was the only case to do so
which involved a trespasser, the category accorded the least duty under the common law. See
Hughes, supra note 15, at 633, and 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 440 (1975).
58. Id. at 298, 333 A.2d at 129. Rhode Island's trespassing child doctrine, which would
have placed a higher duty of care upon the landowner, was not applicable to this case because
the injury occurred prior to the adoption of the doctrine which was given a strictly prospective
application. Id. at 300 n.1, 333 A.2d at 130 n.1.
59. Id. at 307, 333 A.2d at 133.
60. 114 R.I. 294, 310, 333 A.2d 127, 135 (Joslin, J., dissenting).
61. 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
The New York Court of Claims has subsequently decided to disregard the Basso ordinary
negligence standard in a decision concerning a snowmobiler injured when his vehicle struck
a state-owned and maintained dock on a lake. The court referred to § 9-103 of the General
Obligations Law as a codification of the common law rules and declared that the judiciary
Vol. 17: 153
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recently change to the ordinary negligence approach. In Basso, the
plaintiff entered a scenic park at night on a motorcycle operated by
defendant Miller to assist in the rescue of a park patron. He was
injured, while leaving the park, when the motorcycle struck a series
of holes in the road, causing both him and the driver to fall." In
alluding to the confusion created by the common law approach, the
Basso court observed that it was possible for the plaintiff to have
been a trespasser when he entered the property, but an invitee at
the time of injury. 3
Two other jurisdictions, Massachusetts and Minnesota, adopted
the ordinary negligence approach with respect to licensees and invi-
tees, but retained the common law trespasser rule."4 The Massachu-
setts case, Mounsey v. Ellard,15 involved a police officer who was
injured when he fell on some ice which had accumulated on the
defendant's premises. The court, in rejecting the common law ap-
proach, stated that the licensee-invitee distinction tended to
"obscure rather than illuminate the relevant factors which should
govern determination of the question of duty."" However, the court
stopped short of extending the ordinary negligence approach to tres-
passers. This decision was predicated on the reasoning that there is
a significant difference in the legal status of one who trespasses as
opposed to one who enters another's land under some color of right . 7
The court cited no precedent for making this distinction, but merely
stated that it was not pursuaded by the logic and reasoning in
was powerless to change them. Wight v. State, 403 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Ct. CI. 1978). However,
the statute refers only to certain enumerated activities by entrants and does not establish a
duty owed to entrants in general. N.Y. GzN. OBLIo. LAw § 9-103 (McKinney 1978). It will
remain for the New York Court of Appeals to clarify this matter.
62. Id. at 236, 352 N.E.2d at 869, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
63. Id. at 239-40, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567. The plaintiff would have been
a trespasser when he entered the park premises against the wishes of the person at the ticket
gate, a licensee when seen but not ejected by the boss in the parking lot, and an invitee when
assisting in the rescue. Id.
64. This result was also reached statutorily in England. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6
Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).
65. 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
66. Id. at 706, 297 N.E.2d at 51.
67. Id. at 707 n.7, 297 N.E.2d at 51 n.7. While this may be true, it is illogical because it
prevents examination into all the circumstances behind the trespasser's presence. A burglar
should be accorded a different duty than an inadvertent trespasser. See notes 72 & 73 and
accompanying text infra. Justice Kaplan criticized the court for retaining the trespasser rule
because he thought it tended to perpetuate the kind of tradition-bound and mistaken analysis




Rowland. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Peterson v. Blach8 also
refused to follow the common law approach in a case involving a
social guest who was asphyxiated .by gas leaking from a stove while
staying overnight at a friend's cabin. The court, in adopting the
ordinary negligence standard, expressly limited the new standard to
cases concerning licensees and invitees. The implication was that
the court would defer ruling on that question until a case involving
a trespasser was at issue.69The operation of the ordinary negligence approach is simple.
Some critics say it is deceptively simple. 0 Basically, it involves
assessing the defendant's conduct in light of all the circumstances
to determine whether it is reasonable. Status of the plaintiff, al-
though no longer the primary determinant of liability,7' is still rele-
vant to the inquiry. In fact, analysis under the negligence standard
involves the consideration of all the circumstances behind the plain-
tiffs presence. 2 For instance, a burglar would be differentiated from
an inadvertant trespasser, even though both are trespassers. 3 Nev-
ertheless, even though status is relevant under the ordinary negli-
gence approach, its importance has been greatly diminished, and
the primary concern is with the conduct of the defendant rather
than the status of the plaintiff.7"
IV. COMMON LAW APPROACH V. ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE APPROACH
The argument most frequently offered in support of the common
law approach is that it promotes predictability and stability in the
law.7" Many critics have taken issue with this conclusion, insisting
68. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d at 642. See note 57 supra.
69. The court also stated, without citing any authority, that there is often good reason to
distinguish between a trespasser and a social guest. Lastly, the court pointed out that its
action paralleled changes made in England under the Occupiers' Liability Act. 294 Minn. at
165, 199 N.W.2d at 642.
70. See 45 FORD. L. Rav. 682, 689 (1976). The approach is claimed to be deceptively simple
because the broad, general negligence standard provides no guidance to courts or judges for
particular cases. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 243, 352 N.E.2d 868, 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d
564, 569 (1976) (Breitel, J., concurring). But see note 55 and accompanying text supra.
71. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
72. See Common Law Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 839.
73. See 45 FORD. L. REv. 682, 692 (1976).
74. See notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
75. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 105 (Burke, J., dissenting). But see Common Law Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 823
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instead that it has led to confusion.7" The confusion purportedly
arises because of the number of exceptions and subclassifications.
Although criticized for this reason, it has been argued that without
them the common law system would never have survived."
Despite its professed simplicity, the common law approach has
been criticized as being difficult of application.?8 In addition to the
complexity introduced by the numerous exceptions and subclassifi-
cations, difficulty in reaching a proper result arises when the en-
trant's status changes during his stay on the premises.79 In such
instances it is often difficult to clear the first hurdle of determining
the status of the entrant.
On the other hand, the ordinary negligence approach has also
been subject to criticism. A major asserted weakness of this ap-
proach is that too many cases go to the jury, which traditionally
favors plaintiffs, thereby wresting control away from the courts.80 If
this happens, the right of landowners to make free use of their land
is seriously eroded. This concern may be unfounded because courts
have ample means to either withdraw a case from the jury, if neces-
sary,8 or set outer limits upon the exercise of their discretion. 2
Moreover, juries are routinely trusted to decide cases impartially in
other areas of the law.Y
Beyond the differences in the two approaches, a fundamental
question is whether they result in the application of significantly
different standards. The Court in Kermarec clearly maintained that
(exceptions to classifications so numerous that they cannot be applied consistently, uni-
formly, and predictably).
76. This is often advanced as a reason for changing to the ordinary negligence approach.
See Common Law Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 819; 25 ALA. L. REv. 401, 414 (1973).
77. See 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 124, 130 (1975).
78. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 693.
79. See 45 FoRD. L. REV. 682, 685 (1976). See also note 63 and accompanying text supra.
80. Any rule of substantive law or procedure which enlarges the jury's theoretical sphere
tends to extend liability, whereas any rule which restricts that sphere tends to restrict liabil-
ity. See James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 669 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as James]; Common Law Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 848 (plaintiffs
may be favored because of expanding role of juries in the decision process); 45 FoRD. L. Rxv.
682, 689 (1976).
81. See James, supra note 80, at 679. A court may direct a verdict, grant a nonsuit, or
order a new trial in appropriate circumstances. For example, if there is no genuine issue as
to a material fact or if reasonable persons could not differ regarding an issue of fact it would
be proper to withdraw these matters from the jury.
82. Id. at 677.
83. The choice seems to be either to trust juries or discontinue using them. See Hughes,
supra note 15, at 700.
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they did not." The common law jurisdictions, in many cases, apply
a de facto ordinary negligence approach while paying lip service to
the common law classifications. Cases in which an entrant's status
is considered to change during his stay on the premises demonstrate
the primacy of the landowner's state of knowledge of the entrant's
presence, rather than his status, in imposing liability.85 Because the
standards being applied under both approaches are functionally
almost identical, though nominally different, it is said that courts
in both common law and ordinary negligence jurisdictions reach the
same results." Why then is one approach to be preferred over the
other? First, predictability in the law demands that the subjective
rationale in support of court decisions coincides with the expressed
rationale. Second, and more important, plaintiffs with meritorious
causes of action may still be barred from recovery under the com-
mon law system based on their entrant status if they fail to fit
within a suitable exception or subclassification.8' An approach
which allows for such a result, by placing courts in an analytical
straitjacket, is abhorrent to any enlightened system of jurisprud-
ence.
V. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
At the present time, Pennsylvania, along with the majority of
jurisdictions, follows the common law entrant classification ap-
proach to landowner liability.88 Whether this is because an appropri-
84. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. The exceptions to the common law classifi-
cations, many of which take into account the foreseeability of the entrant, show that consider-
ations fundamental to the law of negligence are pertinent. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 645.
85. See Common Law Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 818.
86. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 105 (1968).
87. Two California cases serve as an example whereby status was exalted to the exclusion
of common sense. In one case an individual buying a drink in a local tavern recovered
damages when he was injured by falling into a concealed trap. In another, recovery was denied
under nearly identical circumstances because the plaintiffs friend bought the drink for him,
making him a licensee rather than invitee. See Comment, Torts-Abrogation of Common
Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee, and Invitee, 25 VAND. L. REv. 623 (1972) (citing
Bram v. Vallade, 33 Cal. App. 279, 164 P. 904 (1919) and Kneuser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co.,
22 Cal. App. 205, 133 P. 989 (1913)). See also note 49 and accompanying text supra.
88. See, e.g., Crotty v. Reading Industries, Inc., 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 8, 345 A.2d 259,
263 (1975). This is the only Pennsylvania case to date to even make reference to Rowland
and its progeny. Id. at 8 n.5, 345 A.2d at 262 n.5. The court cites Rowland for the proposition
that liability to entrants on land is not always dependent on status. However, the court was
careful to affirm its allegiance to the common law system. See also Crane v. I.T.E. Circuit
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ate case has not arisen to serve as a vehicle for bringing about a
change in the law is a matter of speculation. It is doubtful that a
case involving an invitee would be suitable since the duty owed to
an invitee closely parallels reasonable care"9-the ordinary negli-
gence standard. In this type of case, recovery would be possible
under either standard, so there would be no need for a change in the
law. The ideal vehicle is a case involving either a trespasser or
licensee in which the plaintiff has a meritorious claim, but cannot
recover under the common law system because he does not fit within
an exception or subclassification, 0 hence is not entitled to a higher
duty than either licensees or trespassers in general.
If the proper case were to arise, Pennsylvania might conceivably
join the minority of jurisdictions which have adopted the ordinary
negligence approach. Pennsylvania cases in this area often contain
cryptic language which could indicate that concepts of ordinary
negligence are already being applied in the decisions." This might
presage a willingness to adopt the ordinary negligence approach if
a suitable case comes before the courts. The reference in Crotty v.
Reading Industries, Inc.9" to Rowland and its progeny can be read
as support for this conclusion. Although the Crotty court affirmed
its allegiance to the common law system, 3 the court was careful not
to criticize Rowland.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has revealed that the claimed advantages
Breaker Co., 443 Pa. 442, 277 A.2d 362 (1971) (possessor of land has duty to use reasonable
care to make premises safe for use of persons invited thereon for business purposes); Engel
v. Parkway Co., 439 Pa. 559, 266 A.2d 685 (1970) (trespasser can only recover if landowner is
guilty of willful or wanton negligence).
89. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
91. See Crotty v. Reading Industries, Inc., 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 11, 345 A.2d 259, 264
(1975) (occupier's duty is one of due care under all the circumstances); Havens v. Strayer,
326 Pa. 563, 568-69, 193 A. 13, 16 (1937) (possession of any kind of property carries with it
the obligation to take every reasonable precaution to prevent people from being injured by
that property); Walker v. Broad & Walnut Corp., 320 Pa. 504, 508, 182 A. 643, 645 (1936)
(general rule that those responsible for care of property maintain it in safe condition for those
whose presence may be anticipated); Philadelphia and Reading R.R. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. 375,
379 (1863) (precaution on part of landowner is a duty only so far as there is reason for
apprehension). See also text following note 84 supra.
92. 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 345 A.2d 259 (1975). See note 85 supra.
93. See note 88 supra.
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of the common law approach to landowner liability are suspect. The
approach, though simple in theory, has proven to be complex and
confusing in operation. 4 As a result, it is doubtful that it has led to
predictability and stability in the law.95 Additionally, many courts
appear to be applying a negligence standard while purporting to
follow the common law standard." Obviously, this does not promote
predictability and stability, nor does it result in simplicity. The real
reason, therefore, that so many jurisdictions retain the common law
approach seems to be primarily attributable to judicial inertia.9"
In contrast, the advantages of the ordinary negligence approach
are substantial. It focuses primarily on the conduct 8 of the defen-
dant rather than the status of the plaintiff. In our democratic so-
ciety, which stresses individual rights over property rights, it would
seem that this emphasis would be almost mandated. The criticism
that this approach leaves the jury without any standards is totally
unfounded."9 The fear that landowners will become insurers appears
equally groundless. °0 Courts have ample means'01 to assure that
recovery is permitted only in cases where an entrant has a merito-
rious claim based on the landowner acting unreasonably. Harsh
results are avoided, since plaintiffs are not non-suited, as a matter
of law because of a failure to fit within an exception or subclassifi-
cation which would allow recovery. 02
On balance, the common law approach has little to recommend
94. See notes 78 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
95. Predictability and stability are claimed to be virtues of the common law approach.
See note 75 supra.
96. See note 84 and accompanying text supra. See also text following note 86 supra.
97. "The law governing the liability of an occupier to persons injured while on his property
seems to have been perdurably frozen in the trident of channels dug by judges of the nine-
teenth century." Hughes, supra note 15, at 633. While stare decisis has a valuable role to play
in the decision making process, it should not be the sole determinant.
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule persists from blind imitation of
the past.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). "A rapid paced urban society,
such as ours, should not be forced to follow an outmoded English status system when even
that country has repudiated its worth." 22 N.Y.L.S.L. Rev. 370 (1976).
98. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
99. See note 55 supra.
100. The adoption of the negligence standard in France did not increase pro plaintiff
verdicts by a substantial amount. See Common Law Tort Liability, supra note 10, at 848.
101. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
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it. Conversely, the ordinary negligence approach seems to strike a
proper balance between assuring the safety of persons entering the
premises of others and allowing landowners to make free use of their
property, provided they act reasonably towards entrants. Pennsyl-
vania courts, and others, would be well advised to adopt the ordi-
nary negligence approach at the earliest possible opportunity.
EDWARD T. MORRISS

